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Independent Immigrant Selection Criteria 
and Equality Rights : Discretion, 
Discrimination and Due Process* 
Anne DOBSON-MACK** 
Le présent texte constitue une réplique à l'article de Walter Chi Yan 
Tom, « Equality Rights in the Federal Independent Immigrant Selection 
Criteria » ((1990) 31 C. de D. 477.)) et dans lequel l'auteur affirmait que les 
critères de sélection de l'immigrant indépendant sont discriminatoires au 
regard de l'article 15 de la Charte constitutionnelle et ne peuvent se 
justifier par l'article 1. 
L'auteure affirme ici que la faculté d'apprécier et d'établir des distinc-
tions dans le cours de la prise de décision administrative en la matière ne 
saurait équivaloir à la discrimination au sens de l'article 15. Elle examine 
le conflit entre la souveraineté de l'Etat et les principes généraux du droit, 
de même que l'utilisation par les tribunaux de la détermination de la 
qualité d'ester en justice pour éviter de se prononcer sur le fond cons-
titutionnel. Enfin, elle critique l'absence de cohérence et de rationalité 
dans la reconnaissance de droits procéduraux à différentes catégories 
d'immigrants. 
This article is a response to Walter Chi Yan Tom's « Equality Rights in 
the Federal Independent Immigrant Selection Criteria », published in 1990 
in this journal, in which it is asserted that the federal independent im-
migrant selection criteria are discriminatory within the meaning ofs. 15 of 
the Charter and are not demonstrably justified according to s. 1. 
* I would like to thank Phil Bryden and Rob Grant for their insights and encouragement. 
** B.A. (Hon. Queen's), LL.B. (U.B.C.), stagiaire, étude de Lawson, Lundell, Lawson and 
Mcintosh, Vancouver. 
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The author argues that Tom badly distorts the section 15 meaning of 
discrimination when he equates the discretion and drawing of distinctions, 
which are part of the administrative decision-making process by which 
independent immigrants are selected, with section 15 discrimination. The 
article also addresses the conflict between State sovereignty and the 
sovereignty of universal legal principles, a conflict which is raised in Tom's 
article. Finally, the author examines the ways in which standing rights 
have been used by the courts in immigration decisions to avoid dealing with 
substantive Charter issues, and criticizes the lack of rationality and co-
herence in the assignment of due process rights to different classes of 
nonnationals under current immigration law. 
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In his article, « Equality Rights in the Federal Independent Immigrant 
Selection Criteria », Walter Chi Yan Tom assesses how well the federal 
independent immigrant selection criteria conforms to the standards of s. 15 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1. Both his analysis of the 
selection criteria's conformity with s. 15, and the assumptions upon which 
the analysis itself is based are flawed. Tom mistakenly concludes that 
several of the independent immigrant selection criteria are discriminatory 
W.C.Y. TOM, «Equality Rights in the Federal Independent Immigrant Selection Cri-
teria», (1990) 31 C. de D. 477. The selection criteria can be found in Schedule of the 
Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/91-497, which relates to ss. 3, 7, 8, and 11 of the 
Immigration Act, R.S.C. (1985), c. 1-2. F.N. MARROCCO and H.M. GOSLETT, 1992 
Immigration Act of Canada, Toronto, Carswell, 1991, p. 535. 
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within the meaning of s. 15 of the Charter and are not demonstrably 
justified according to section 1. In addition, he fails to address some 
fundamental issues in his assessment of the current admissions policy. 
Tom's faulty anaylsis is illustrative of the confusion which surrounds the 
issue of equality rights in the context of the inherently discriminatory 
process of immigration. In my critique of some of the flaws in Tom's 
analysis of the selection process, I raise and explore some of the difficult 
questions which lie at the heart of this confusion. If Canadian immigration 
policy is to defend against accusations of discrimination, the basic ques-
tions raised in this paper must be clearly addressed, if not definitively 
answered, by Canadian immigration policy-makers. 
In the introduction to « Equality Rights », the author states that immi-
gration and admission to Canada, as noted by the courts, are seen as 
privileges to be determined by statute and regulation, rather than a matter 
of rights2. Making distinctions between people in terms of their rights and 
privileges is described as an exercise of State sovereignty which is « a basic 
premise of any immigration system3 ». Tom points out that these distinc-
tions, made as an exercise of State sovereignty are most often based on 
citizenship and nationality differences. Finally, he admits that immigration 
law is « inherently unequal in terms of its application to citizens and aliens » 
and as a result, the alien/citizen inequality is « difficultly challenged »4. 
2. W.C. TOM, supra, note 1 at 479. At footnote 5 the author cites ss. 5 and 8 of the 
Immigration Act and the cases of Cronan v. M.M.I. (1973) 3 I.A.C. 84, Masella v. 
Langlais, [1955] S.C.R. 263,281, Vaaro, Worozcyt and Others v. The King, [1933] S.CR. 
36, 42 and Prata v. Ministry of Manpower and Immigration, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 376, 380 as 
examples of this understanding of immigration as a privilege rather than a right. 
3. W.C. Y. TOM, supra, note 2. Edward Morgan analyses the problematic relationship which 
exists between the doctrine of State sovereignty (the sovereignty of the nation over the 
domestic legal order, in this case over immigration policy) and the doctrine of the 
transcendent sovereignty of law over State rights. This dilemma is all the more acute 
when the Constitution of a sovereign State, like our Charter, which incorporates the 
State's international human rights commitments, is applied to the State's domestic law 
concerning aliens. This dilemma will be dealt with in the final part of the paper. See 
E. MORGAN, «Aliens and Process Rights: The Open and Shut Case of Legal Sover-
eignty », (1988) 7 Wis. Int'l L.J. 107, and «International Law in a Post-Modern Hall of 
Mirrors », (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 207. By contrast, see the following articles by Guy 
S. Goodwin-Gill and Christian Brunelle, which deal with the relationship between these 
doctrines, but do not regard it as problematic : G.S. GOODWIN-GILL, « The Status and 
Rights of Nonnationals », in HENKIN and ROSENTHAL, Constitutionalism and Rights, 
New York, Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 151 and C. BRUNELLE, « La primauté du 
droit : la situation des immigrants et des réfugiés en droit canadien au regard des Chartes 
et des textes internationaux », (1987) 28 C. de D. 585, 611-612. 
4. W.C.Y. TOM, supra, note 3. 
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1. The Problem of Closed Borders and Human Equality 
Having made the above admissions regarding the right of the sovereign 
State to make citizen/alien distinctions that are most often based on nation-
ality differences, Tom next asserts that the «role of equality rights is still 
of primordial importance in distinctions based on the enumerated and 
analogous grounds of s. 15 of the Charter, such as race and religion, which 
are entirely inappropriate and of a discriminatory nature ». How does Tom 
marry his admissions concerning the right of the sovereign State to make 
nationality-based citizen/alien distinctions with his assertion regarding the 
primordial importance of s. 15 rights in distinctions based on enumerated 
and analogous grounds, in light of the fact that one of the enumerated 
grounds of s. 15 is « national or ethnic origin5 » ? Is there not a contradiction 
between the assertion that the role of equality rights is of primordial 
importance in distinctions based on the enumerated and analogous grounds 
of s. 15 and the assertion that a basic premise of any immigration system is 
the right of a sovereign State to make distinctions between people based on 
nationality and citizenship ? Pondering these questions forces us to face the 
basic contradiction between the equality declared (regardless of citizen-
ship) in s. 15 of the Charter, and the inequality inherent in any admissions 
system other than that of open borders6. 
In « Due Process and Membership in the National Community : Pol-
itical Asylum and Beyond », David Martin acknowledges the apparent 
unfairness of the use of alienage (an accident of birth) as the only factor that 
5. Section 15(1) ofthe Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.R.), 1982, c. 11, states: «Every 
individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability [emphasis added]. » 
6. One popular justification for closed borders in a world where our place of birth is purely 
accidental, can be summarised as follows. Opening our borders would likely result in an 
influx of those who could afford to emigrate from nations where the standard of living is 
significantly lower than that enjoyed in Canada (heavily weighted to third world im-
migrants). The result would be a brain drain on third world nations and a possible drop in 
the standard of living in Canada. The end result would be a net loss, since the Canadian 
government's ability to contribute to the transfer of technology, skilled labour and capital 
would decline drastically and the influx of immigrants could stretch the social safety net 
beyond its capacity. The general fear regarding an uncontrolled influx of immigrants is 
that industry would employ them at wages lower than those which obtained prior to the 
influx, and this would mean a drop in the general standard of living enjoyed in Canada. 
The counterargument to this is that many immigrants are employed in jobs that Canadians 
will not do, and their low wages in these areas of employment do not have a negative effect 
on the wages of Canadian workers in other employment areas. Indeed, by saving industry 
money in one employment sector, low immigrant wages likely help keep wages artificially 
high in sectors dominated by Canadian-born workers. 
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differentiates the procedural protection enjoyed by citizens from that ap-
plicable to first-time applicants for admission7. He states that : 
Placing so much weight on a characteristic wholly divorced from voluntary action 
and from any notion of individual merit may seem fundamentally unfair, whereas 
due process, we have been told, is about fairness. Birthplaces simply exist ; they 
were not chosen. Giving them even the significance advocated here perhaps 
cannot be defended on purely moral grounds, on a rigorously policed process of 
reasoning only from neutral, rational, and a historical principle. But, as Anthony 
Kronman writes, « although morality requires us to look at human affairs from the 
timeless standpoint of reason itself, its prescriptions must somehow be accom-
modated to the contingent and irrational features of the human condition. » Those 
features include « the natural attributes that it its our accidental fate to possess »8. 
In a paper focussed on the application of equality rights in the context 
of immigration selection, the problem of justifications for any kind of 
discrimination in admissions (apart, perhaps, from restrictions on the 
admission of dangerous criminals) ought to be addressed. Rather than face 
this thorny question head on however, Tom avoids the issue and promotes 
a selection system which could, in the final analysis, result in the admission 
of all applicants who could describe their immigration as furthering one of 
the immigration policy objectives enumerated in s. 3 of the Immigration 
Act9. 
2. Selection Criteria10 : The Problems of Discretion, 
Distinction, and Discrimination 
Applying equality rights to a « selection » process is problematic : 
choosing one individual over another involves a process of discrimination, 
7. D. MARTIN, «Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political 
Asylum and Beyond», (1983) 44 U. Pitt L. Rev. 165, 217. 
8. Ibid. In relation to this issue Martin notes the work of several authors. B. ACKERMAN, 
SocialJustice in the Libérât State, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980, pp. 89-95, 
critically examines the reasons generally given for closed borders and reveals their 
profound shortcomings. A. BICKEL, The Morality of Consent, New Haven, Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1975, is suggested as a counterpoint to Ackerman. Bickel (supra, p. 11) warns 
against « pretensions to universality [...] overconfident assaults on the variety and unruli-
ness of the human condition [and] the intellectual and emotional imperialism of concepts 
like freedom, equality, even peace. » Finally the works of A. KRONMAN, «Talent Pool-
ing », in XXII Nomos : Human Rights, vol. 58, no. 77, 1981, and M. SANDEL, Liberalism 
and the Limits of Justice, New York, Cambridge University, 1982, are recommended as 
thoughtful analyses of this problem. 
9. Tom does not address the issue of what he would consider to be justifiable grounds for 
exclusion. Based on the kinds of distinctions which he finds discriminatory and not 
justified according to section 1 of the Charter, though, it is likely safe to say that he would 
not object to national health or national and community security based justifications for 
exclusion. 
10. Schedule Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/91-497 ; F.N. MARROCCO and H.M. Gos-
LETT, supra, note I. 
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in the broad sense of the word. Indeed, as Christopher Wydrzynski has 
noted, a key function of immigration law is to single out certain groups for 
differential treatment, in terms of their legal rights to enter and remain in 
Canada". Wydrzynski explains: 
[P]rima facie, such treatment may be seen as a violation of guarantees of equal 
treatment. However, such an interpretation of this fundamental right is unlikely 
and unwarranted with regard to the immigration field. Not only would such an 
interpretation undermine immigration legislation completely, but it would con-
tradict the historical rationale for immigration control12. 
In addition, it must be recognised that, given the kinds of restrictions 
we currently place on immigration, the kind of decision made by an immi-
gration official necessarily involves subjective elements13. In addition, the 
restrictions we place on immigration generally involve some kind of sub-
jective national judgment on why and in what situations we want to restrict 
access to membership in our community. While we want the officials who 
make the ultimate decisions as to who is admitted into membership in our 
community to be « discriminating », we want them to discriminate on the 
basis of an applicant's merits or capacities, and not on the basis of irrel-
evant considerations such as the grounds prohibited by section 15 of the 
Charter. 
2.1 Discrimination 
Any attempt to define the meaning of « discrimination » in section 15 
must begin with Justice Mclntyre's explanation of the concept in Andrews 
v. Law Society of British Columbia*4. In his valuable study of section 15 of 
the Charter, Dale Gibson notes that Mclntyre's concept of discrimination, 
which was approved by his colleagues on the Supreme Court of Canada, 
can only be understood through a careful analysis of several separate but 
connected passages in his reasons15. In one key passage, Justice Mclntyre 
11. C. WYDRZYNSKI, Canadian Immigration Law and Procedure, Aurora, Canada Law 
Book, 1983, p. 467. 
12. Ibid. 
13. And the restrictions we place on immigration generally involve some kind of subjective 
national judgment on why and in what situations we want to restrict access to member-
ship in our community. 
14. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 289 
[hereinafter Andrews]. 
15. For an informative discussion of the meaning of discrimination in section 15 of the 
Charter, see : D. GIBSON, The Law of the Charter : Equality Rights, Toronto, Carswell, 
1990, especially the discussion of the relation of « equality » to « discrimination » at p. 102 
and Chapter IV, «Discrimination, General Considerations» at pp. 109-161. See also 
A.F. BAYEFSKY, « Defining Equality Rights », in M. EBERTS and A.F. BAYEFSKY (eds.), 
Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Toronto, Carswell, 
1985, p. 1. D. GIBSON, supra, note 15 at 110. 
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explains that discrimination involves disadvantage to the victim, and that 
«personal characteristics » must be involved. He states : 
[Discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or not but 
based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, 
which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations or disadvantages on such 
individual or group not imposed on others, or which withholds or limits access to 
opportunities, benefits and advantages available to other members of society. 
Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual solely on 
the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge of discrimina-
tion, while those based on an individual's merits and capacities will rarely be so 
classed16. 
Later in his judgment, Mclntyre J. notes that a further necessary 
ingredient to discrimination is that the distinction in question be «pe-
jorative » or in other words, that it involve «prejudice ». He remarks : 
The words « without discrimination » [ins. 15(1)] require more than a mere finding 
of distinction between the treatment of groups or individuals. Those words are a 
form of qualifier built into section 15 itself and limit those distinctions which are 
forbidden by the section to those which involve prejudice or disadvantage17. 
Dale Gibson notes that « prejudice » has two meanings : 1) injury 
and 2) unreasonableness/lack of just grounds, both of which are involved in 
the s. 15 meaning of discrimination. There is a debate as to whether the 
«unreasonableness » aspect of prejudice should be considered in relation 
to s. 15(1) or only in relation to a s. 1 analysis, once a distinction has been 
found discriminatory. Regardless of the point at which it is considered, it is 
clear that an examination of the « reasonableness » of a distinction is a vital 
part of what is involved in dealing with laws, (in this case, regulations), that 
are alleged to be discriminatory within the meaning of s. 15(1) of the 
Charter18. 
In examining whether the independent immigrant selection criteria is 
discriminatory within the meaning of section 15, a portion of Justice La 
Forest's concurringjudgment in Andrews is worthy of note. Describing his 
conception of s. 15 discrimination, (which was in substantial agreement 
with that of Mclntyre J.), La Forest J. states : 
I am convinced that it was never intended in enacting s. 15 that it become a tool for 
the wholesale subjection to judicial scrutiny of variegated legislative choices in no 
way infringing on values fundamental to a free and democratic society. Like my 
colleague, [Mclntyre J.], I am not prepared to accept that all legislative classifica-
tions must be rationally supportable before the courts. Much economic and social 
policy-making is simply beyond the institutional competence of the courts : their 
16. Andrews, supra, note 14, [1989] 2 W.W.R. at 308. 
17. Id. at 313. 
18. D. GIBSON, supra, note 15 at 115. 
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role is to protect against incursions on fundamental values, not to second guess 
policy decisions*9. 
Given the policy-oriented nature of immigration law in general and 
selection criteria in particular, this description of the purpose of section 15 
of the Charter should be kept in mind in any analysis of the conformity of 
immigration admissions criteria to that section. 
2.2 Discretion 
Walter Chi Yan Tom is right when he characterizes the independent 
immigrant selection criteria format as very similar to the process in-
volved in applying for employment. He finds this process unacceptable, 
describing it as « biased towards skilled workers and professionals of lower 
age » and hinting that the « Canadians first » premise of the policy re-
presents a continuation of Canada's history of ethnic discrimination20. 
Furthermore, Tom judges those categories in the selection criteria that are 
dependent on a discretionary evaluation by a visa officer to be prima facie 
discriminatory in the sense of s. 1521. Although I take issue with most of 
Tom's conclusions regarding the non-conformity of the selection criteria 
with s. 15 of the Charter, I will limit my response and deal with only a few of 
the most serious problems in his analysis. 
A significant flaw in Tom's analysis lies in his equation of discretion 
with discrimination. Tom argues that the attributes in category nine are 
« all subjective ones and thus depend on the discretion of the judging visa 
officer22 ». He also complains that the standards upon which an officer 
bases her decision are the standards of a Canadian citizen. Because dif-
ferent people from different cultures may judge these attributes differently, 
Tom somehow reaches the conclusion that category nine is prima facie 
discriminatory. What he fails to establish is how and why Canadian im-
migration officials should distinguish between applicants from anything but 
a Canadian perspective23.1 am not suggesting that the consideration of an 
applicant's « personal suitability », based on a personal interview, should 
19. Andrews, supra, note 14, [1989] 2 W.W.R. at 297 (emphasis added). 
20. W.C.Y. TOM, supra, note 1 at 495-496. 
21. Id. at 496. 
22. W.C.Y. TOM, supra, at 409. 
23. It is likely fair to say that an alien who chooses to apply to immigrate accepts the fact that 
her application to become a part of our community will be considered according to 
Canadian standards. This is not to say that Canadian immigration officers are insensitive 
to the standards of other cultures, but rather that applications will be measured according 
to the standard of qualities valued in Canada, which will, after all, be the successful 
applicant's new home. 
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necessarily remain part of the decision-making process24. What I would 
suggest is that subjectivity and discretion in decision-making of this kind 
are not equivalent to the kind of discrimination prohibited by section 15 
of the Charter. While subjective or discretionary decision-making may 
sometimes involve distinctions based on prejudice, and would therefore be 
discriminatory, such decisions are by no means necessarily prejudiced and 
discriminatory in nature. Using section 15 to label bad decision-making 
« discriminatory » is a misuse of the Charter. 
While the determination of «personal suitability», (category nine) 
based on an interview with a visa officer is largely subjective and may 
involve the exercise of discretion, this does not mean that it is discrimi-
natory within the meaning of section 15 (nor that it is not justifiable 
according to s. 1 of the Charter) as Tom argues25. Tom equates discretion 
and subjectivity with discrimination, and is completely blind to the positive 
elements of flexibility and humanity which are also aspects of the kind of 
discretionary decision-making at issue here. Tom claims : 
[c]ertain categories in the selection criteria are dependent on a discretionary 
evaluation by the visa officer and appear prima facie, discriminatory in the sense 
of s. 15 of the Charter. Even in the more objective categories, the visa officer has 
the discretion to refuse or approve an application notwithstanding the assessed 
unit total, if in his opinion, it does not reflect the chances of the applicant becoming 
successfully established in Canada26. 
The fact that a decision has strong subjective elements, does not mean 
that it creates a disadvantage based on a section 15 prohibited ground. 
When a visa officer decides that an applicant's points total does not truly 
reflect her ability to successfully establish herself in Canada, and the 
officer grants a visa based on her professional assessment of the applicant, 
she is not disadvantaging other applicants on a ground prohibited by s. 15. 
24. See P.L. BRYDEN, « Fundamental Justice and Family Class Immigration The example of 
Pangliv. Minister of Employment and Immigration », (1991) 41 U. Toronto L.J. 484,523-
524, regarding the use of trial-type procedures in a mass adjudication system, particularly 
his criticisms regarding efficiency and systemic bias. If it could be established that the 
immigration interview resulted in a systemic bias in the system, and this bias constituted 
discrimination within the meaning of s. 15 of the Charter, then I would agree that the 
personal suitability category is discriminatory. This is not the argument that Tom makes, 
however. 
25. Immigration Act, supra, note 1, Category 9, Schedule I: 
PERSONAL SUITABILITY 
Units of assessment shall be awarded on the basis of an interview with the person to 
reflect the personal suitability of the person and his dependants to become successfully 
established in Canada based on the person's adaptability, motivation, initiative, re-
sourcefulness and other similar qualities. [10 units max.] 
26. W.C.Y. TOM, supra, note 1 at 496. 
558 Les Cahiers de Droit (1993) 34 c. de D. 549 
By allowing an officer some discretion, an otherwise rigid system is injec-
ted with some flexibility. It is also important to note that the officer's 
discretion in this area is not untrammelled ; rather, it is exercised within the 
reasonably well-defined framework of the selection criteria, (and their 
objectives), as a whole27. 
It is likely true that most applicants for immigration have the ability to 
become successfully established in Canada. What this means is that the 
assessment of an applicant's ability to become established in Canada is not 
a very precise tool to employ in differentiating between applicants28. In 
making differentiations between equally qualified individuals, any tool is 
imprecise ; but this does not mean that its use results in discrimination. 
It should be noted as well that many discretionary decisions under the 
Immigration Act, such as those involving sections 37,70,77 and 114(2), can 
only operate to benefit individual applicants. That is, those who do not 
qualify can be included but those who do qualify cannot be excluded using 
these provisions. The existence of such provisions may, however, mean 
that we develop rules for exclusion that are broader than are necessary 
to achieve our social objectives. This certainly seems to be the case 
with respect to inadmissibility and removability on medical and criminal 
grounds, for example. The point here is that at the margins, an entirely 
discretionary system, an entirely rule-oriented system, and a mixed system 
like ours will all produce benefits to at least some people and disadvantages 
to at least some others. To substantiate his claim that the Canadian system 
is discriminatory within the meaning of section 15 of the Charter, it is not 
enough for Tom to show that our system results in some disadvantage to 
some people, since any system will produce some disadvantages ; what he 
must show is that the kinds of disadvantages our system produces are 
stigmatized by section 1529. 
27. E. KINGDOM, What's Wrong With Rights?: Problems for Feminist politics of Law, 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1991, p. 113, contrasts policies that rely on 
defined rights and those that rely on judicial discretion. Her critique of discretion 
concludes : « It may be that discretion works better in areas of law which are reasonably 
well established but that in undeveloped areas of law [...] the use of discretion is 
particularly problematic. For if there are no reasonably clear principles and rules, there is 
no clearly defined framework within which discretion can be exercised. » 
28. As stated above, however, it does allow an officer to use her discretion in extreme cases 
where her judgement tells her that an applicant very clearly would (or would not) settle 
successfully, regardless of their points total. Tom also ignores the fact that the personal 
interview gives the claimant an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, 
to answer questions put to her and to know that her application has been considered. 
29. I thank Phil Bryden for bringing this point to my attention. 
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In his discussion of the impact of Charter guarantees on immigration 
processes, Christopher Wydrzynski notes that « definitional approaches to 
particular rights may have to take into consideration the special adminis-
trative, discretionary and policy-oriented nature of immigration law30». 
Unfortunately, Tom fails to take the special discretionary nature of im-
migration law into consideration in his definitional approach to section 15 
equality rights. The kind of discretionary power involved in the immigra-
tion selection process can be strongly criticised on the grounds that it opens 
the door to inconsistent decision-making. But bad decision-making is not 
the same thing as discriminatory decision-making. Tom may have valid 
concerns about bad decision-making in Canada's immigrant selection pro-
cess, but he fails to establish that the process is prejudiced/unreason-
able, within Justice Mclntyre's authoritative conception of s. 15 discrimi-
nation31. 
2.3 Distinction and Discrimination 
Tom's most serious misuse of the equality provision of the Charter 
occurs in his section 15 analysis of the occupational demand category of the 
selection criteria in Schedule One32. Tom states : 
In Item 4 a distinction is made between independent immigrants based on the kind 
of occupation the applicant is qualified for, disadvantaging those whose occupa-
tions are less valued according to the occupational list [...] this loss of points may 
lead to the risk of inadmission for lack of a sufficient point total or even immediate 
disqualification33. 
According to Tom's reasoning above, a distinction between one appli-
cant and another disadvantages some applicants, and the consequence of 
this disadvantage could be disqualification. Whether this constitutes dis-
crimination in the sense of s. Mclntyre's judgment in Andrews v. Law 
Society of B.C.34 as authority for the proposition that « distinctions based 
on personal characteristics would almost certainly be discriminatory, 
while distinctions based on an individual's merits or capacities, almost 
always fell outside the concept of discrimination35 », Tom goes on to assert 
30. C. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 11 at 466. 
31. See text at notes 14-18, supra. 
32. Immigration Act, supra, note 1, Category 4, Schedule I: 
OCCUPATIONAL DEMAND 
Units of assessment shall be awarded on the basis of employment opportunities available 
in Canada in the occupation that the applicant is qualified for and is prepared to follow in 
Canada, such opportunities being determined by taking into account labour market 
demand on both an area and "national basis. [10 units max.] 
33. W.C.Y. TOM, supra, note 1 at 500. 
34. Andrews, supra, note 14, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. 
35. W.C.Y. TOM, supra, note 1 at 494. 
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that « [t]he occupation of an individual is a personal aspect that is for most 
cases « unalterable except on the basis of unacceptable costs and in some 
cases, unalterable by conscious actions »36. » 
Two objections must be made to these assertions. Firstly, the fact that 
a distinction imposes disadvantages does not necessarily mean that it 
constitutes discrimination within the meaning of s. 15 of the Charter. 
Denying someone an undeserved benefit, like immigrant status, would be 
disadvantageous, but it would not be discriminatory31'. Secondly, the as-
sertion that an individual's occupation is an immutable personal character-
istic38, in the sense of being « typically not within the control of the in-
dividual » as defined by La Forest J. in Andrews, is simply ridiculous in an 
age when it is estimated that the average person will experience a number 
of occupational changes in their lifetime39. It is tantamount to saying that a 
government hiring decision which is based on occupational distinctions 
between applicants is discriminatory, because it takes the job applicant's 
immutable characteristics into account. While Tom may not believe that 
occupational factors should be relevant to admissions decisions, to assert 
that a claimant's occupation is an immutable personal characteristic is to 
distort the concept of « immutable » and « personal characteristic » which 
was intended by the Supreme Court justices who introduced the concept in 
the context of section 15 of the Charter40. It is one thing to argue, as Tom 
does41, that immigration selection based on Canada's present labour needs 
is short-sighted, but to claim that it is discriminatory within the meaning of 
s. 15 of the Charter is something else altogether. In the same way that he 
36. Id. at 501, quoting from the judgment of La Forest J. in Andrews (emphasis added). 
37. D. GIBSON, supra, note 15 at 111. 
38. In his study of equality rights in the Charter, D. GIBSON, supra, note 15 at 214, notes that 
« [i]n the context of the Charter and human rights legislation « immutability » appears to 
mean « alterable with great difficulty, if at all » ». For occupation to be an immutable 
characteristic in the context of immigration, would mean that distinctions between 
immigration applicants could not be based on occupational factors, without being dis-
criminatory (and perhaps saved by s. 1). This flies in the face of the policy-oriented nature 
of immigration selection. Immigration is not a right of all who apply, and distinctions 
between applicants must be made. Given the social safety net in place in Canada, it is not 
surprising that the government is concerned that immigrants be employable in Canada. 
« Employable » does not necessarily mean highly skilled or professional. In the context of 
immigrant selection, Immigration Canada has the opportunity to choose new members of 
the community. It is submitted that in making this choice, the consideration of an 
applicant's occupational experience and skills is highly relevant. 
39. D. Canon, Career Counsellor, Queen's University at Kingston, Ontario, 1989. 
40. See D.GIBSON, supra, note 15 at 157-161, re immutability and Analagousness : Personal 
Characteristics. 
41. Id. at 516-517. 
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failed to consider the special discretionary nature of immigration law in 
examining the discretionary nature of some admissions decisions, Tom 
also fails to take the special policy-oriented nature of immigration law into 
account in his analysis of occupation-related selection criteria42. Walter 
Chi Yan Tom may not agree with the labour market oriented, « Canada 
first » immigration policy currently in place, but he stretches section 15 of 
the Charter beyond its limits in his analysis of the independent immigrant 
selection criteria. It is submitted that it was precisely the kind of Charter 
review of immigration policy undertaken in « Equality Rights » that La 
Forest rejected when he said he was convinced : 
that it was never intended in enacting s. 15 that it become a tool for the wholesale 
subjection to judicial scrutiny of variegated legislative choices in no way infringing 
on values fundamental to a free and democratic society43. 
And that he was : 
not prepared to accept that all legislative classifications must be rationally sup-
portable before the courts. Much economic and social policy-making is simply 
beyond the institutional competence of the courts : their role is to protect against 
incursions on fundamental values, not to second guess policy decisions44. 
In «Equality Rights», Tom uses s. 15 of the Charter to challenge 
criteria related to job experience and vocational training as well as occu-
pational demand45. He submits that the occupational factor in category 4, 
(and consequently categories 2 and 3 as well), «is discriminatory in its 
indirect effects on immigrants from nations whose choice or access to those 
occupations « valued » by Canada's immigration criteria are limited, due to 
the social, economic, and political conditions in these nations. » Tom goes 
on to argue that if a broad and generous interpretation of analogous grounds 
of discrimination is used, his analysis does not « «overshoot the actual 
purpose of the right or freedom in question», nor is it stretching the 
imagination to characterize immigrants who are forcibly disadvantaged by 
their livelihood, as members of a discrete and insular minority46 ». 
42. See text at note 21, supra. 
43. Andrews, supra, note 14, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. 
44. Id., [1989] 2 W.W.R. at 297 (emphasis added). 
45. W.C.Y. TOM, supra, note 1 at 502. 
46. Id. at 502. Quoting from the judgment in R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, re «over-
shooting» the actual purpose of the right in question. A major problem with Tom's 
analysis lies in his failure to address the issue of how Canada ought to determine who is 
granted immigrant status, if not through a process similar to that of applications for 
employment. Admittedly, such a process is not suited to applicants for refugee status, and 
family reunification considerations are key in the selection of family class applicants. But 
if considerations as to vocational skills, experience and occupational demand should not 
be taken into account in choosing independent immigrants, what criteria should govern 
the decision instead ? 
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Whether we understand the selection of immigrants whose vocational 
skills are valued in Canada to constitute a violation of s. 15 of the Charter, 
depends on our assumptions about the rationale for immigration policy. In 
his remarks to a panel on the Philosophy and Mechanics of the Selection 
System, at the 1990 Conference on Canadian Immigration Law and Policy, 
the Director General of Immigration Policy, (Andre Junau), proposed a 
framework of questions to think about. Junau emphasised the need to ask : 
What are the main assumptions about the rationale for immigration policy ? 
And since the selection of immigrants should follow from this rationale, 
what kind of constraints does this place on selection policy47 ? 
Our assumptions about the rationale for immigration policy, in turn, 
depend on how we understand the relationship between Canada's right, as 
a sovereign State, to define membership in the nation through immigration 
law on the one hand, and our Charter/international covenant commitment 
not to discriminate on national or ethnic grounds, on the other. Can s. 15 of 
the Charter be interpreted as broadly as Tom suggests ? What impact do 
our international commitments have on our domestic immigration pol-
icy48 ? Is Canada violating its s. 15 commitment to transsovereign human 
rights law by differentiating between immigration applicants based on 
occupational factors ? Differentiating between overseas refugees based on 
vocational factors (which Canada has been accused of in the past), is 
thought by many to be reprehensible, but in the case of individuals who 
have chosen to apply to immigrate to Canada for reasons other than 
asylum-seeking, is it unfair to consider such factors ? The answers to these 
questions depend on how one views immigration. Is it akin to business 
recruiting, or is it more like an international equalization programme ? We 
47. In his address, Junau remarked on the centrality of immigration to the way Canadians see 
themselves (noting that this varies across the country). He also noted that population 
movements, while not new, are nonetheless a new challenge to governments all over the 
world. Finally, he reminded his audience that in addition to policies and rules on selec-
tion, immigration is also about foreign policy and international trade. (« Outline of 
Remarks by Andre Junau, Director General, Immigration Policy, to a Panel on the 
Philosophy and Mechanics of the Selection System », in Canadian Immigration Law and 
Policy, Montreal, Canadian Bar Association, 1990.) 
48. Irwin Cotler writes about the problem of States that sign international covenants, but 
make only a facial commitment to these agreements in their domestic law and legal 
system. Cotler criticises the Soviet Union for its purely facial commitment to mobility 
rights. He argues that to be meaningful, mobility rights must include accessory mobility 
rights (e.g. the State's granting necessary travel documents), and he urges Canada, a co-
signatory to the covenant in question, to bring pressure to bear and remind the Soviets of 
their commitment. Cotler also points out that the right to emigrate is, in many ways, 
meaningless because no concomitant right to immigrate exists. (I. COTLER, « The Right to 
Leave and to Family Reunification », (1987) 28 C. de D. 625.) 
A. DOBSON-MACK Independent Immigrant 563 
are able to see immigration as both, but we must admit the contradiction 
between the two visions. 
The contradiction between our two views of aliens is an illustration of 
the fundamental contradiction between universal and particularized legal 
norms49. In « Aliens and Process Rights : The Open and Shut Case of Legal 
Sovereignty », Edward Morgan attributes the fundamental contradiction 
that underlies our views of aliens to the fact that « [i]n domestic and 
international legal discourse, aliens are a reflection of ourselves. » He 
explains that since we as individuals have a « deeply split personality » — 
understanding ourselves as undifferentiated, universal beings one minute, 
and as differentiated, national beings the next—we tend to have a double 
vision of aliens as well50. In legal discourse, this split personality ultimately 
translates into two distinct and incompatible theories about how our legal 
order is constituted. These theories, in turn, are the bases for two distinct 
understandings of sovereignty. Conceptions of the sovereignty of the State 
over members of foreign nations, (e.g. domestic immigration law), clash 
with notions about the sovereignty of universal legal principles, (e.g. 
universal human rights principles), as over the assertions of the state. The 
dilemma caused by this clash of understandings of sovereignty is especially 
acute when universal legal principles are incorporated into a domestic law 
of constitutional stature, as in the case of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. In examining the conformity of immigration selection 
criteria to the Charter, we are forced to recognize the fundamental con-
tradiction that underlies immigration decisions. How we interpret the 
effect of the Charter on immigration selection criteria depends, to a great 
extent, on which conception of sovereignty we believe ought to govern in a 
given situation. 
3. Standing and Due Process 
3.1 The Locus Standi Problem 
In an examination of the independent immigrant selection criteria's 
conformity with section 15, a consideration of independent immigration 
49. P.L. BRYDEN, supra, note 24 at 517. 
50. E. MORGAN, supra, note 3 at 147. A less poetic person might explain our « double vision » 
respecting aliens as resulting from our tendency to make rational decisions based on a 
desire to maximize the benefit to ourselves, rather than attributing it to «split person-
ality ». We are nationals when it serves our best interests and internationalists if and when 
we believe that the benefits outweigh the costs. The problem with the rational decision-
maker model is that it does not account for differences in the way that individuals derive 
benefits (i.e. why one person derives benefit from acting altruistically, and another 
derives benefit from completely self-centred behaviour). 
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applicants' standing rights (i.e. their right to bring actions complaining of 
the non-conformity of the selection criteria with s. 15 of the Charter) is of 
considerable importance51. When «Equality Rights» was written, there 
was a lacuna in the law regarding the applicability of the Charter to 
nonnationals not present in Canada. In the case of Dolack v. M.M.I, the 
Federal Court of Appeal held that the Canadian Bill of Rights applied only 
to people living in Canada52. In 1986, the Supreme Court of Canada decided 
the case of Singh v. M.E.I.53. In her judgment, Wilson J. defined the word 
« everyone » in section 7 of the Charter to include « every human being who 
is physically present in Canada and by virtue of such presence amenable to 
Canadian law54». 
Since the decision in Singh, Charter guarantees which are not 
expressly limited to citizens, have been interpreted to apply to citizens and 
aliens alike. When « Equality Rights » was written, there had not yet been a 
decision concerning the applicability of the Charter to aliens outside Can-
ada : it remained an open question. As a result, Tom was free to carry out 
his s. 15 Charter assessment of the independent immigrant selection cri-
teria, based on the assumption/prediction that the rights and guarantees of 
the Charter applied equally to everyone (or « every individual » in the case 
of s. 15 rights) regardless of location. 
The state of the law in this area has changed since « Equality Rights » 
was written ; the legal lacuna has been filled by the decision of the Federal 
Court Trial Division in Ruparel v. M.E.I.55. At issue in that case was the 
question of whether s. 19(2) of the Immigration Act is inconsistent with 
51. While standing is important, the ability (in terms of financial, psychological, emotional, 
and legal resouces) of a person involved in the immigration process to bring a Charter 
action is also key. B. JACKMAN, «Advocacy, Immigration and the Charter», (1990) 
9 Imm. L.R. (2d) 286,293, notes that : « in realistic terms, ordinary people involved in the 
immigration process do not have the resources to litigate challenges raising Charter 
issues. Unless they have a lawyer assisting in the immigration process, most won't even 
recognise that there is an issue of fairness or discriminatory action involved. Those who 
are actually in Canada, such as illegals and refugee claimants, are not in a much better 
position to challenge a refusal of their application in a court. » Even if a nonnational has a 
lawyer, this does not mean that they will likely bring an action challenging the Charter. 
The reason for this, Jackman explains, is that many immigration practitioners are hesitant 
to take on Charter litigation. This is an understandable position, given that bringing a 
Charter challenge takes huge amounts of time, energy, and resources, none of which are 
plentiful for most people involved in the immigration process. 
52. Dolack v. M.M.I., [1983], 1 F.C. 194 [hereinafter Dolack]. 
53. Singh et al. v. M.E.I. [1985] 58 N.R. 1, 1 S.C.R. 177 [hereinafter Singh]. 
54. Singh, supra, note 53, [1985] 58 N.R. 1 at 49. See also C. WYDRZVNSKI, « Notes on Singh . 
v. M.E.I. », (1986) 64 Can. B. Rev. 172, 176. 
55. Ruparel v. M.E.I. (1990) 11 Imm. L.R. (2d) 190 (F.C.) [hereinafter Ruparel]. 
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section 15 of the Charter. The applicant was in England when he applied as 
an independent with the assistance of his brother, who was a Canadian 
citizen. Although the Court believed Ruparel's s. 15 argument had merit, 
the application failed because it was made from outside of Canada. The 
Court ruled that « every individual » in s. 15 includes every human being 
who is physically present in Canada. The Court rejected the argument that 
the High Commission in London, where Ruparel made his application, was 
in fact Canada. 
The decision in Ruparel has important implications for the standing 
rights of independent applicants in general. Due to the fact that application 
for immigrant visas must generally be made from outside Canada, (see 
sections 9(1) and 9(4) of the Immigration Act), most applicants for im-
migrant status lack standing to invoke the rights and guarantees of the 
Charter, including the s. 15 equality guarantees which are the focus of this 
study56. Although a Trial Division decision is by no means the last word on 
the issue, Ruparel does represent the state of the law today. 
While standing is conceptually distinct from the existence of a legal 
right, it is only fair to recognise that courts sometimes use standing as a 
vehicle to avoid reaching a conclusion on the validity of a cause of action 
that they do not want to reach. The Ruparel decision is a good example of 
this. It is fairly clear that in that case the judge did not want Ruparel's claim 
to succeed, but he was not prepared to accept a section 1 justification, so he 
rejected Ruparel's application based on standing. By contrast, in section 7, 
Bill of Rights and fairness cases, the courts have been quite willing to 
entertain a claim of legal right, and standing has not appeared to be a barrier 
to the assertion of such a claim made by aliens who are outside Canada's 
borders. It must be recognised then, that standing can be used instrument-
ally by courts to avoid coming to grips with the kinds of problems in our 
current immigration system that Walter Chi Yan Tom would like to see 
addressed57. 
3.2 Due Process and Standing Confusion 
In the section of his article entitled « Locus Standi : a Right or a 
Privilege », Walter Chi Yan Tom misinterprets the meaning and implica-
tions of Justice Wilson's decision in Singh v. M.E.I, in relation to aliens 
who are not claiming refugee status58. Tom points out that because im-
56. See sections 115(l)(ii) and 115(2) for exemptions to the requirements in ss.9(l)and9(4)of 
the Act ; also, see the Appendix for further discussion of the standing problem. 
57. I thank Phil Bryden for clarifying this issue. 
58. Singh v. M.E.I., supra, note 53, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177. See W.C.Y. TOM, supra, note 1 at 
487-489. 
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migration is seen as a privilege rather than a right, the due process rights of 
immigrants are less than those of residents. He describes some of the 
criticism which the distinction between rights and privileges has received, 
quoting from Wilson J.'s decision in Singh where she recognised that the 
appellant refugee claimants in that case were entitled to fundamental 
justice in the determination of whether they were convention refugees59. 
This entitlement was theirs due to the serious potential consequences for 
them of a denial of refugee status rather than as a result of the traditional, 
formalistically defined legal rights or privileges accorded to refugee claim-
ants. In «Notes on Singh v. M.E.I. », Christopher Wydrzynski explains 
that Wilson's judgment means : 
In a sense, aliens had statutory « rights » under the Immigration Act, 1976 (for 
example, a « right » under section 55 not to be removed to a country of persecu-
tion). Despite the fact that in general alien status could be viewed as a privilege, 
refugee claimants have significant statutory rights which can be protected by the 
Charter60. 
Tom misunderstands Wilson's reasoning and misapplies it in his at-
tempt to create a firm legal foundation for his assumption/prediction that 
the Charter applies to aliens not present in Canada. After admitting that in 
the case of Dolack v. M.M.I., supra, the Federal Court of Appeal found 
that the Canadian Bill of Rights applied only to persons living in Canada, 
Tom states : « However, if the same reasoning of Singh may be applied to 
the differentiation on the basis of location as it was applied to that of status, 
then it would be possible for aliens to invoke the guarantees of the Charter 
regardless of location61. This proposition ignores the reason behind Wil-
son J.'s decision not to use the traditional right/privilege distinction in 
determining the kind of process rights to which the claimants were entitled. 
In her decision in Singh, Justice Wilson stated : « Given the potential 
consequences for the applicants of a denial ofthat status [...] it seems to me 
unthinkable that the Charter would not apply to entitle them to fundamen-
tal justice in the adjudication of their status62. » The reason she felt strongly 
that the claimants were entitled to fundamental justice in the determination 
of whether they were convention refugees is clear from the above quota-
tion— the potential consequences for them, should they be denied status, 
59. In the passage referred to, Wilson J. states: «The creation of a dichotomy between 
privileges and rights played a significant role in narrowing the scope of the application of 
the Canadian Bill of Rights [...] I do not think this kind of analysis is acceptable in relation 
to the Charter [...] Given the potential consequences for the appellants of a denial of 
status [...] it seems to me unthinkable that the Charter would not apply to entitle them to 
fundamental justice in the adjudication of their status. Singh, supra, 1 note 53 at 209-210. 
60. C. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 54 at 176. 
61. W.C.Y. TOM, supra, note 1 at 489. 
62. Singh, supra, note 53 at 209-210 (emphasis added). 
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were extremely serious. As refugee claimants, the appellants in Singh were 
in a position where denial of status could mean that they would be sent back 
to face persecution, torture, or even death in their home country63. 
This is simply not so in the case of a denial of independent immigrant 
status, which is the issue in Tom's analysis. For independent immigrant 
applicants, the consequence of differentiation based on location is the 
denial of Charter rights. While this may seem a serious consequence, to be 
true to the spirit of Wilson's reasoning in Singh, we must go one step 
further and determine the consequences, for an immigration applicant, of 
being denied Canadian Charter rights. The worst possible consequence of 
the denial of Charter rights would be a denial of immigrant status. I hardly 
need to note that the consequences of being denied immigrant status are not 
of the same magnitude as the consequences of a denial of refugee status. 
This means that there is no justification for the « same reasoning of Singh » 
to be « applied to differentiation on the basis of location as it was applied to 
that of status », (to quote Tom's proposition) at least in the case of indepen-
dent immigrant applicants64. 
3.3 The Problem of Aliens and Due Process Rights 
The different kinds of procedural protection granted to different cat-
egories of nonnationals in Canadian law appear to be more the product 
of accident than that of thoughtful jurisprudence. In light of the lack of 
rationality in this area of immigration law, it is little wonder that Tom got 
lost in the confusion. This confusion is illustrated in the lack of coherence 
in the due process rights that are currently granted to different classes of 
63. C. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 54 at 176-177 citing Wilson in Singh, supra, note 53, [1985] 
58 N.R. at 39, highlights the fact that the section 55 «right » of refugee claimants was 
particularly important because it was a right not to be removed to a country of persecu-
tion. Wilson J. even used international law to interpret the s. 55 right to benefit the 
claimants, stating that they were « entitled to rely on this country's willingness to live up 
to the obligations it has undertaken as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on 
Refugees. » 
64. Though it could be argued that non-inland refugee claimants ought not to be differentiated 
from inland refugees based on location. Of course broadening the application of Charter 
guarantees to include those not physically present in Canada is not the only way to make 
those guarantees applicable to independent immigrant applicants. Allowing all visitors to 
Canada to apply for immigrant status from within this country would give them Charter 
protection. Needless to say, this broad policy will not be adopted. It would almost 
certainly result in the arrival of an influx of visitors, who would try to put down roots as 
quickly as possible, in order to fight removal orders (or who would simply count on 
Immigration Canada's inability to remove them). Unless the ministry were willing to 
increase target numbers significantly, this policy would result in either a large number of 
(costly) removals or severe restrictions in the granting of visitor's visas. 
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aliens. To summarize : the protections in the Canadian Bill of Rights and 
the Charter apply only to those physically present in Canada65 ; the fairness 
doctrine, a principle of Canadian administrative law, applies to everyone, 
regardless of status or location66 ; while the Canadian Bill of Rights applies 
to the sponsors of family class immigration applicants, but not the ap-
plicants themselves67. 
If we are to remedy the confusion which reigns in this area, we must 
return to first principles and address some fundamental questions. The first 
question which must be addressed in any consideration of the due process 
rights of aliens is : how should a court decide what process is due ? What is 
an acceptable framework for assessing the due process claims of different 
groups of nonnationals ? In « Due Process and Membership in the National 
Community : Political Asylum and Beyond », David Martin explores these 
questions in depth and constructs a framework for assessing the due 
process claims of different groups of nonnationals, based on a claimant's 
« level of membership in the community68 ». Martin's thesis is based on « a 
basic intuition » that, « quite apart from any instrumental considerations 
looking toward administrative burdens, we, as a national community, 
somehow owe less in the coin of procedural assurances to the first-time 
applicant for admission than we do our fellow citizens or to permanent 
resident aliens, or even to nonimmigrants who have been among us for 
awhile69. » 
The implications of Martin's system for the independent immigrant 
class are fairly clear. Because most applications for immigration must be 
65. Dolack, supra, note 52, and Ruparel, supra, note 55. 
66. The seminal case regarding the imposition of a general duty of procedural fairness is Re 
Nicholson and Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police, [1979] 
1 S.C.R. 311. The following are immigration cases involving the use of the fairness 
doctrine : Muliadi v. M.E.I., [1986] 2 F.C. 205 (F.C.A.) ; Hui v. M.E.I., (1986) 65 N.R. 69 
(F.C.A.) and Ho v. M.E.I., (1990) 111mm. L.R. (2d) 12 (F.C.A.). For a discussion of the 
use of the doctrine of fairness in an immigration context see : P.L. BRYDEN, supra, 
note 24 at 497-500. 
67. Pangli v. M.E.I., [1988] 4 1mm. L.R. (2d) 266 (F.C.A.). 
68. D. MARTIN, supra, note 7 at 194-195. See also A. ALEINIKOFF'S response to Martin: 
« Aliens, Due Process and « Community Ties » : A Response to Martin », (1983) 44 U. Pitt 
L.R. 237. Aleinikoff is justifiably critical of a serious flaw in Martin's work, namely, 
his approach to refugees. Humanitarian considerations inhabit a realm which is distinct 
from (and indeed above) that of community considerations. The considerations which go 
to a decision to grant asylum to a refugee are altogether different from those that go to a 
decision to grant a person immigrant status. Considerations of the process due to im-
migrant applicants and refugee claimants, likewise, should be distinct, even if it means 
that Martin must abandon his goal of developing one framework for assessing all due 
process claims. 
69. D. MARTIN, supra, note 7 at 192. 
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made from outside the country, many members of the independent class 
have no ties to the Canadian community (beyond their desire to join it) 
when they make their application70. It may be that following Martin's 
assessment framework would result in little actual change in the process 
rights of applicants for Canadian immigration. It could be argued that 
family class members, having important family ties with members of the 
Canadian community, generally have greater ties to Canada than do in-
dependents. As a result, they would generally deserve greater procedural 
protection. As explained above, this is in fact the case in Canada today : 
family class immigrants, through the Bill of Rights claims of their sponsors, 
have greater procedural protection than do independent class applicants. 
But we must look at more than the practical results of our system and any 
system to which we compare it. The attractiveness of developing a care-
fully considered assessment framework lies in the fairness, situation-sen-
sitiveness, and clarity of the process through which decisions are derived 
as well as in the fairness of the results. I am not suggesting that we adopt 
Martin's assessment system71. I am however, suggesting that we replace 
the illogical current system, with a carefully considered assessment frame-
work. To do this, we must return to first principles and ask the same 
fundamental questions that David Martin did. 
Wilson J's decision in Singh represents a revolution in the Canadian 
approach to due process. In her judgment, the traditional right/privilege 
distinction was flatly rejected in favour of a more pragmatic, situation-
sensitive approach which requires that the court consider the interests 
at stake when it decides the level of procedural protection due a given 
claimant. In «Fundamental Justice and Family Class Immigration», 
supra, Philip Bryden applauds this revolution in Canadian due process law. 
He recognises that judicial definition of classes of people able to assert due 
process claims based on either the magnitude of harm associated with the 
denial of their claim, or some philosophical or social consensus that what is 
at stake is worthy of special protection, presents some problems. « [B]ut at 
least it gets us thinking about what ought to be the central problem, which is 
how we ought to conceive of the areas of human relations with government 
that deserve special constitutional safeguards72. » Bryden urges Canadian 
judges, legislators and immigration policy makers to think about what it is 
70. As illustrated in the case of Ruparel, supra, note 55, however, independent class ap-
plicants may have family ties with members of the Canadian community which fall 
outside of the ties that are necessary for them to qualify for family class immigration. 
71. As I indicated above, when applied to refugees, the community ties approach is wrong-
headed. An approach which considers the interests at stake, like that of Justice Wilson in 
Singh, is preferable. 
72. Singh, supra, note 53 at 516. 
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they are trying to achieve in mandating constitutional review, and em-
phasizes the need to ask whether a value is sufficiently transcendent before 
allowing it to be «judicially defined and frozen into our structure for 
making immigration decisions73 ». He also warns that the traditional view 
of trial-type procedures as « the paradigm of fair and just procedures » 
is unjustified and extremely problematic in a mass adjudication context 
like that of immigrant selection74. In the development of a new, care-
fully considered assessment framework, Bryden's conclusions, and the 
warnings they contain should be kept in mind. 
Conclusion 
Although Walter Chi Yan Tom failed to establish that the independent 
immigrant selection criteria in the Immigration Act constitute a violation of 
the equality section of the Charter, his article is nonetheless valuable for 
the important issues it raises. Are aliens protected by the Charter, and if so 
what implications does this have for Canada's admissions policy ? What is 
the present framework for assessing the procedural protection that aliens 
are due, and how might it be improved ? « Equality Rights in the Federal 
Independent Immigrant Selection Criteria » also raises the issue of what 
constitutes good administrative decision-making. The article points us to 
areas where improvements may need to be made in Immigration Canada's 
decision-making processes. And perhaps most importantly, Walter Chi 
Yan Tom's arguments regarding equality in admissions criteria, force us to 
confront the fundamental contradiction that underlies immigration de-
cisions. 
Appendix 
If Ruparel v. M.E.I, is followed, the legal situation today is such that the only feasible 
way to challenge the independent immigrant selection criteria as violating s. 15 of the Charter 
would be by way of an action brought by an individual who had applied for immigration from 
within Canada. A public interest action would not be possible. According to the Federal Court 
of Appeal decision in Canadian Council of Churches v. Regina, public interest standing will 
only be granted when : a) there is a serious issue to be tried ; b) the plaintiff has a genuine 
interest as a citizen in the validity of the impugned legislation (i.e. she/he is not a «mere 
busybody ») and c) there is no other reasonable and effective manner in which the issue may 
be brought before the court (e.g. where the parties who are directly affected by the impugned 
legislation are not able to bring the action themselves)75. 
73. Id. at 531. 
74. Id. at 485 and 518-532, while Bryden finds the trial type process problematic in immigra-
tion situations, he does not find it so in refugee situations. 
75. Canadian Council of Churches v. Regina, (1990) 10 Imm. L.R. (2d) 81 (F.C.A.). 
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In light of the Ruparel decision, applicants for independent immigration who are not 
present in Canada (the parties directly affected by the provisions of the Immigration Act), are 
not able to bring an action protesting the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of the Act. 
Whether a party seeking public interest standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 
independent immigrant selection criteria will meet the genuine interest requirement described 
in b) above, will depend on the Court's assessment of the nature of their interest76. But, while 
there is no question that an allegation that the selection criteria for independent immigrants, as 
set out in the Immigration Act, is discriminatory within the meaning of section 15 of the 
Charter constitutes a serious issue to be tried, MacGuigan J.A. in Canadian Council of 
Churches stated that a public interest action like the one under discussion here, « could found 
a right of standing, but cannot constitute a reasonable cause of action since the claimants 
affected would all be non-citizens outside Canada with no claim to admission, and therefore 
beyond the scope of the Charter77. » When Ruparel is read in conjunction with Canadian 
Council of Churches, it is clear that it would not be possible to bring a public interest action 
challenging the selection criteria's Charter conformity. 
Section 3(f) of the Immigration Act 
Section 3(f) of the Immigration Act provides some support for the argument that there is a 
serious public interest at stake when an allegation of discrimination in the immigrant selection 
process is made, despite the fact that the claimants affected would be non-citizens outside of 
Canada, as stated by MacGuigan J. in Canadian Council of Churches1*. According to that 
section, the standards of admission are subject to the scrutiny of the Charter and particularly 
the test of discrimination in section 15. This means that Parliament has recognized that the Act 
should conform to the Charter. If our government is committed to bringing the Immigration 
Act into conformity with the Charter, there is no logical reason why a public interest action 
could not be brought by concerned Canadians. While they might not be directly affected by 
the Charter violation in question, it could be argued that they are affected by their govern-
ment's failure to live up to the standards it has set for itself in section 3(f) of the Immigration 
Act. With respect, I disagree with MacGuigan J.A.'s finding that this does not constitute a 
« reasonable cause of action ». 
When dealing with the objectives section of the Act, however, it must be kept in mind that 
s. 3 includes a long list of competing and often contrary objectives. In addition, the objectives 
76. The fact that public interest standing was granted to Joseph Borowski in Minister of 
Justice of Canada v. Borowski (No. 1), [1981] (S.C.C.) 2 S.C.R. 575, indicates that the 
test to meet requirement (b) is a low one. 
77. Canadian Council of Churches v. Regina, (1990) 106 N.R. 61 at 77 (F.C.A.). This passage 
is cited in Muldoon J.'s decision in Ruparel, supra, note 55 at 26 (QuickLaw transcript). 
78. Immigration Act, R.S.C. (1985), c. 1-2: 
Section 3 Immigration Objectives 
It is hereby declared that Canadian immigration policy and the rules and regulations made 
under this Act shall be designed and administered in such a manner as to promote the 
domestic and international interests of Canada recognizing the need : 
(f) to ensure that any person who seeks admission to Canada on either a permanent or 
temporary basis is subject to standards of admission that do not discriminate in a 
manner inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
572 Les Cahiers de Droit (1993) 34 c. de D. 549 
section of the Immigration Act is very rarely cited in immigration decisions, and when it is 
referred to , it is only used in a conclusionary way79. 
In « Equality Rights » Walter Chi Yan Tom concedes that the objectives section of the 
Act has traditionally been viewed as « at best, vague rules of statutory construction » which 
are not referred to in most immigration decisions80. He argues, however, that « they form an 
underlying rationale of Canadian immigration policy, which requires a balance to be main-
tained between competing principles81 ». Furthermore, Tom claims that « with the advent of 
the Charter, the nature and role of these objectives have taken on a greater significance as they 
now serve as the basis upon which the guarantee of Charter rights are judged82. » Due to the 
fact that considerations concerning the objectives of impugned legislation are involved in a 
section 1 Charter test, section 3 of the Act may become more significant in Immigration Act-
related Charter litigation83. 
79. J .H. G R E Y , Immigration Law in Canada, Scarborough, Buttersworth, 1984, p. 15 ; 
C.J. WYDRZYNSKI , supra, note 11 at 72-73. 
80. W.C.Y. T O M , supra, note 1 at 512. 
81. Ibid. 
82. Ibid. 
83. It should be noted that section 3(f) of the Act has been cited in only one of the reported 
Federal Court decisions regarding the Charter to date, and in none of the recently 
reported cases (see Armadale Communications Ltd. v. M.E.I. (F.C.A.) (1991) (Quick-
Law transcript at 5)). Although the objectives section of the Act may not loom large in 
immigration decisions, it is viewed as significant by the immigration policy makers. In a 
paper on discrimination, equality and immigration policy (presented at the CBA immigra-
tion law and policy seminar in 1990), Mildred Morton of the immigration and policy 
branch of Employment and Immigration Canada describes the success that Canadian 
immigration policy has had in meeting the s. 3(f) objective that admissions policies should 
not discriminate in a manner inconsistent with the Charter. Morton cites the following 
1988 data on landing by way of illustration : « In 1988 25 % of all persons landed in Canada 
as immigrants came from Europe and 4 % from the U .S. By contrast, 43 % came from Asia 
and the Pacific, 14 % from Africa and the Middle East and 14 % from Central and South 
America. » (M. M O R T O N , «Discrimination, Equality, and Immigration Policy», in Ca-
nadian Immigration Law and Policy, Montreal, Canadian Bar Association, 1990, p. 4. 
More recent data on landing shows that this pattern of high immigration from Asia and the 
Pacific, and low immigration from Europe and the U.S. has continued to date (IMMIGRA-
TION C A N A D A , Immigration Statistics, Ottawa, Immigration and Demographic Policy 
Group, Employment and Immigration Canada (annual) 1989, 1990). 
